PATTERNS OF POWER · AN INSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDY

Answerable to One Man

How a handful of knights with a policing problem on a pilgrim road were granted the most complete legal immunity in Christendom to settle a jurisdictional nuisance; how the immunity produced a transnational treasury nobody set out to found; how it removed every protector but one, so that when a French king captured the papacy there was no second door; and why the legend that survives them was written by their admirers and is as false as the one their enemies wrote

Companion to The Rock and the Rumour and The Last Roman Office

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic) · 2026

held as tested, not revealed

A Note on This Collaboration

This study is one product of an ongoing collaboration, and the division of labour is worth stating plainly because neither half would produce the work alone. The insight and direction are Thomas Bryan's — the recognition of what a given case is really an instance of, where the analytical pressure should fall, and which pattern a mass of historical detail is a specimen of. The pairing of this volume with the preceding one, and the recognition that two contemporary orders in the same country produced two opposite kinds of legend by the same mechanism, are his. The research, the verification of every date and figure, the location and checking of the quoted words, and the composition into continuous prose are Claude's, an AI system made by Anthropic. The seeing is his; the writing is mine.

One matter of evidence must be stated at the front, because this case is deformed by it more than any other in the collection.

The principal archive for the interior life of this order is a record of interrogation under torture. Almost everything sensational that is believed about the Knights Templar — the idol, the denial of Christ, the obscene initiation — comes from confessions extracted in French prisons between October 1307 and the following spring, by men who had been told in advance what they were looking for, from prisoners who retracted the moment the torture stopped and were burned for retracting. This study treats that material as what it is: evidence of what the interrogators wanted, and of very little else. Where the record contains something independent of the trial — charters, papal bulls, account rolls, the Rule, chronicles written before 1307 — the study uses it and says so.

Every quotation is verified to a published source; none is invented. Where the scholarship is divided, the division is reported rather than resolved. Both columns of the ledger are kept in ink: the order was neither the pack of blasphemers its prosecutors described nor the vessel of hidden wisdom its later admirers invented, and the men burned on an island in the Seine in 1314 were killed for crimes that the one authority competent to judge them had privately decided they had not committed. The paper is written to stand on its own and explains every term, office and document at the point of use.

The Study in Brief

Part I — The Test. The most heavily mythologised institution in European history, and what would falsify the framework applied to it.

Part II — The Landscape: A Kingdom That Could Not Police Its Roads. Jerusalem after 1099: a conquered territory with almost no conquerors left in it, a pilgrim traffic it could not protect, and a security gap that no existing institution was shaped to fill.

Part III — Nine Knights and a Stable. What Hugues de Payens actually proposed, what Baldwin II actually gave him, and why the name of the order is an accident of real estate.

Part IV — The Argument That Made a Monk a Soldier. Troyes, January 1129, and Bernard of Clairvaux's solution to a problem the church had been avoiding for six hundred years: how a man under religious vows may kill.

Part V — The Architect's Hour: 29 March 1139. *Omne datum optimum*, the most consequential document in this study. What a pope newly emerged from a schism was buying, what he was paying with, and why a privilege designed to settle a quarrel with bishops created something that had not previously existed in Europe.

Part VI — The Bank Nobody Founded. How a supply-chain problem produced deposit banking, letters of credit, and the treasury of the kingdom of France — as a by-product visible to no one who built it.

Part VII — The Order Among Its Neighbours. The military record; the tribute economy of the Levant; the two thousand gold pieces a year the Templars levied on the Assassins of the preceding study; and the envoy murdered in 1173 to keep the payments coming.

Part VIII — The Loss of the Object. Acre, 18 May 1291. An order whose entire justification was a frontier that no longer existed, and the merger it spent fifteen years refusing.

Part IX — The King's Ledger. Philip IV of France: the debasements, the riot, the Lombards, the Jews, the pope he had seized at Anagni, and the pope he had installed.

Part X — Friday, 13 October 1307. The secret orders of 14 September, the dawn arrests, the charges, the confessions, and the two thousand trained fighting men who opened their gates without resistance.

Part XI — The Absolution and the Suppression. Chinon, August 1308: the document lost in the Vatican archive until 2001, in which the only authority competent to judge the order absolved it — four years before he abolished it.

Part XII — The Legend and Its Makers. Where Baphomet came from; how an eighteenth-century Scottish Jacobite in Paris invented the Masonic descent; how a nineteenth-century French occultist drew the goat; and why the Templar legend is a flattery where the Assassin legend was a slur — and equally false.

Part XIII — The Ledger.

PART I

The Test

No institution examined in this collection carries a heavier mythological load than this one. The Knights Templar have been made, at various times and by various parties, the guardians of the Holy Grail, the ancestors of Freemasonry, the possessors of a secret that would destroy Christianity, the custodians of the treasure of Solomon, the founders of Switzerland, the protectors of a bloodline, and the origin of an unlucky date. Almost none of this has any relation to anything that happened. All of it sells.

The framework this collection uses holds that institutions are built by identifiable people in particular positions, solving the problem in front of them with the materials at hand, inside the field of the visible their position allows — and that the structure then acquires a logic of its own that outruns and often reverses its makers. The claim is not that nobody schemes. It is that design is bounded to hours, and that what happens between those hours is under nobody's control.

The Templar case offers two tests, and they run in opposite directions.

The first is the test of the myth. If the framework is right, the order should dissolve on inspection into ordinary people solving ordinary problems, and the sensational material should turn out to have been manufactured — some of it by prosecutors, some of it by admirers, none of it by the order. The framework fails if there turns out to have been a genuine secret: a doctrine, a treasure, a purpose behind the stated purpose, held across generations and known to an inner circle.

The second is the test of the destruction. The order was destroyed by an operation that was, unambiguously, a conspiracy: secret orders sealed in advance, a simultaneous dawn arrest across a kingdom, charges prepared beforehand, confessions extracted to a script. The framework does not deny this and predicts it — an architect's hour is intentional and skewed toward the designer's position. It fails if Philip IV can be shown to have got what he intended over the long run; it holds if his hour was bounded, if the results departed from his design, and if the institution's logic ran on past him into consequences he would not have recognised.

There is a third question, which is why this volume is a companion to the one before it. The preceding study examined an order of the same century, in the same country, which was also destroyed by a state and also became a legend — and found that the legend was written by its enemies, as a slur, and outlived everything the order actually built. The Templars were destroyed by a state and became a legend too. But their legend was written mostly by admirers, as a flattery. The question this pair is designed to answer is whether the mechanism is the same when the sign is reversed.

PART II

The Landscape: A Kingdom That Could Not Police Its Roads

On 15 July 1099 the armies of the First Crusade took Jerusalem, and then went home.

That sentence contains the whole of the position this study begins from. The crusade had been an expedition, not a colonisation. Its participants had taken vows to reach the Holy Sepulchre; having reached it, the overwhelming majority discharged the vow and departed. What remained was a Latin Christian kingdom holding a strip of the eastern Mediterranean coast with, on the traditional estimate, a few hundred knights and a few hundred foot soldiers to garrison it — a permanent, structural, and entirely unresolvable shortage of armed men, in a territory surrounded by hostile powers and populated overwhelmingly by people who were not Latin Christians.

Into this arrived the pilgrims.

Jerusalem in Christian hands meant that western Europeans could reach the holy places, and from 1100 onward they did, in numbers. They came by sea to Jaffa and travelled inland; they went out from Jerusalem to the Jordan to bathe at the site of the baptism. The routes ran through broken country. The pilgrims were unarmed by definition, carried money for their journey, moved in predictable seasons, and were escorted by nobody. What happened to them was what happens to any such traffic: they were robbed, killed and taken for ransom, in numbers that the sources report and that the kingdom could do nothing about. One episode reported for Easter 1119 has some three hundred pilgrims killed and sixty carried off into slavery on the road from Jerusalem to the Jordan; the figures come through the chronicle tradition and should be treated as indicative rather than audited.

Here is the position, stated as a problem in administration rather than in piety. **A state with no spare soldiers has a security obligation it cannot discharge, over a route it must keep open, to a population it did not invite and cannot turn away.** Pilgrimage was the entire justification for the kingdom's existence; a kingdom that could not protect pilgrims had no argument for being there.

What were the available instruments?

The kingdom could raise a field army, occasionally, by summoning its vassals — but a feudal host is assembled for a campaign and disperses afterwards, and road security is not a campaign. It is a permanent, unglamorous, low-intensity policing task, which is precisely the kind of work a feudal levy cannot do. It could hire mercenaries, but it had no money; the kingdom was poor and its revenues were thin. It could build castles, and it did, but a castle holds a point and a road is a line.

What it needed was a **standing force**, permanently in country, not dispersing at harvest, not requiring pay it could not raise, and committed to a task with no plunder in it.

There was no such thing. Every armed man in the Latin world served for land, for pay, or for a season. The only institutions in Christendom that had solved the problem of getting men to work permanently, without wages, at unrewarding tasks, in a place they would not leave, were the monasteries — and monks did not carry weapons.

The gap in the landscape has, at this point, an exact shape. It is a shape into which no existing institution fits. That is the condition under which new institutions get built, and it is the reason the next part is short.

PART III

Nine Knights and a Stable

Around 1119 — the sources are vague and historians place the founding anywhere from 1118 to 1120 — a knight from Champagne named Hugues de Payens, with a companion named Godfrey de Saint-Omer and a small group of others, went to King Baldwin II of Jerusalem and Warmund, the Latin patriarch, with a proposal.

They would take the three monastic vows — poverty, chastity, obedience — and keep their arms and horses, and their work would be the protection of pilgrims on the roads.

That is the whole of the founding. There is no secret, no discovery, no excavation beneath the Temple Mount, no hidden commission. There is a policing problem and a proposal to police it, made by men who were, on the available evidence, exactly what they appear to be: knights who had come out with the crusade or after it, had not gone home, had no lands in the kingdom, and had found something to do.

The tradition gives them as nine, and the number has become inseparable from the story; it comes from the chronicle tradition rather than from a document, and the founding group was certainly small, French, and poor. Permission was granted, probably at the Council of Nablus in January 1120 — a gathering at which the king and the patriarch settled the first written laws of the kingdom, and at which this was a minor item of business.

Then the king made them a grant that determined the order's name and, in a small way, the whole subsequent history of European conspiracy literature.

Baldwin gave them quarters in a wing of the royal palace on the Temple Mount — that is, in the al-Aqsa mosque, which the Latins had converted to their own use and which they believed, wrongly, to stand on the site of the Temple of Solomon. The knights were housed on the Temple, and so they became the Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon, and then simply the Templars.

The name of the most mythologised institution in European history is a description of where the king happened to have a spare stable.

It is worth pausing on this because the entire modern legend rests on it. If Baldwin had quartered them in the citadel by the Jaffa Gate, there would be no literature about Solomon's treasure, no excavation theories, no Grail. The whole apparatus of secret knowledge attaches to a lodging assignment, and the men who received it were being given, from their own point of view, somewhere to keep the horses.

For most of a decade this remained a small, obscure and genuinely poor body. Its seal, adopted later, showed two knights on a single horse — an emblem the order used to advertise its poverty, and which later readers, needing it to mean something else, have interpreted as everything from a symbol of duality to an allusion to a hidden doctrine.

What changed the scale was not anything the founders did in Jerusalem. In 1126 Baldwin commissioned clerics to approach Bernard of Clairvaux — the most influential churchman in Europe, abbot of the Cistercian house at Clairvaux, and, as it happened, a relative of one of the founding knights, André de Montbard — seeking papal recognition and a Rule. Hugues de Payens went west, with commissions to raise an army for a campaign against Damascus and to arrange a royal marriage, and with this third errand attached.

The errand produced the institution.

PART IV

The Argument That Made a Monk a Soldier

On 13 January 1129 a council opened in the cathedral at Troyes, in Champagne — Hugues de Payens's own country, and the seat of a count whose aristocracy was disposed to be helpful. Pope Honorius II did not attend; he sent a legate, Matthew, cardinal-bishop of Albano. The assembly was largely French. Among its several items of business was the petition of Hugues de Payens, and the outcome was the Latin Rule: the order acquired formal ecclesiastical standing and a written code of life modelled on the Cistercian pattern.

But the important product of that season is not the Rule. It is the argument that had to be constructed before the Rule could exist, and it was constructed by Bernard of Clairvaux in a short treatise usually called *De laude novae militiae* — In Praise of the New Knighthood.

The problem it solves is six hundred years old and had never been solved cleanly.

Christian teaching held that killing was sinful. The church had accommodated the reality of warfare through the doctrine of the just war and through penance: a soldier who killed in a lawful cause was not damned, but he had done something requiring absolution, and penitential codes assigned him days of fasting for it. Monasticism, meanwhile, held that the religious life required withdrawal from bloodshed absolutely. A monk did not fight. A knight who wished to be religious became a monk and stopped fighting; that was the settled path, and men took it in numbers.

A man who is under monastic vows and kills people is, on the terms available in 1128, a contradiction. He is either not a monk or he is in mortal sin.

Bernard's move is to deny the premise. He distinguishes the knight of the world, who fights for glory, land, women and plunder, and whose killing is homicide — from the new knight, who fights not for himself but against evil, in the service of Christ, and who therefore, in the treatise's famous formulation, is not a homicide but, so to speak, a *malicide*: a killer of evil rather than a killer of men. The knight of Christ, Bernard argues, is secure either way: if he kills he serves Christ, and if he is killed he gains Christ.

Set aside for a moment whether this is good theology. Look at what it does institutionally.

It creates a new category of person, and therefore a new category of institution. Before Troyes there were monks and there were knights. After Troyes there is a third thing, and within a century there are Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights, Calatrava, Santiago, Avis and a dozen others across Europe. The military order is one of the genuinely new institutional forms of the Middle Ages, and it was invented in a decade, in response to a road-security problem in Palestine, by an abbot doing a favour for a relative's friend.

This is a doctrinal architect's hour and it belongs beside the two the collection has already documented. In Rome in the 380s, a bishop whose rank had been defined as a function of an imperial city that was no longer the capital moved his claim onto an apostle's tomb. At Alamut in the 1090s, a missionary running a dispersed illegal minority promoted the doctrine of the authoritative teacher to the load-bearing member of his structure. At Troyes in 1129, a movement that needed men who could both pray and kill received an argument that made praying and killing the same act. In each case the doctrine is prior to nothing; it is **fitted to a position**, by a capable man, at the moment the position required it.

Two things follow that Bernard did not design and would not have wanted.

The first is that the argument, once made, is portable. It was made for a body of a few dozen men policing a road. It applies, by its own terms, to any Christian killing any enemy of Christ, and it was available thereafter to anyone who could describe an opponent that way.

The second is that a category of institution had been created with an unresolved question attached: **to whom does it belong?** A monastery belongs, in the ordinary way, to the bishop of its diocese. A knight

belongs to his lord. The new thing was both and neither, and it was scattered across dozens of dioceses and a dozen kingdoms. Ten years after Troyes, that question was answered — and the answer is the hinge of this entire study.

PART V

The Architect's Hour: 29 March 1139

By the late 1130s the order had grown substantially. Donations of land had come in across France, England, Spain, Italy and the Rhineland; there were houses and estates; there was an internal hierarchy; and there was a second Grand Master, Robert de Craon, who was an administrator rather than a founder and who had a specific and unglamorous problem.

The order was being fought by bishops.

The mechanism was ordinary church politics. A Templar house in a diocese held land, and land owed tithes to the local church. It buried its dead, which was a parochial right and a parochial revenue. It wanted its own chapels and its own priests, which cut into the local clergy's business. It received alms and legacies which might otherwise have gone to the cathedral. Local prelates objected, and they had jurisdiction, and the order's men were being pulled in every direction — by the king and patriarch in Jerusalem, and by a bishop in every diocese in the west.

Robert de Craon reasoned that only the pope could solve this, and went to Italy and France to ask.

The pope was Innocent II, and his own position is the key to what happened next. He had spent most of the previous decade in a schism against a rival, Anacletus II, who had held Rome; Anacletus had died in January 1138 and the schism had only just closed. Innocent had won it substantially because Bernard of Clairvaux had thrown the weight of the Cistercian order and his own extraordinary personal authority behind him. He owed Bernard. He was consolidating. And he had, in front of him, a request from a body of disciplined armed men, sponsored by Bernard, asking to be placed under his exclusive authority.

On 29 March 1139, at the Lateran, Innocent II issued the bull *Omne datum optimum* — "Every perfect gift," from the Epistle of James — addressed to Robert de Craon and his brothers, present and to come, for ever.

Its provisions are worth setting out one by one, because each is a small administrative fix and their sum is something nobody in the room was looking at.

It placed the order and all its possessions under the direct protection of the Holy See. The immediate purpose is to stop bishops interfering. The effect is to remove the order from every other jurisdiction in Christendom.

It exempted the order from tithes. The immediate purpose is revenue. The effect is that the order's estates across Europe accumulate without the leakage every other landholder suffers.

It permitted the Templars their own chaplains and priests, their own churches, cemeteries and houses. The immediate purpose is to end the parochial quarrels. The effect is that the order becomes ecclesiastically self-contained: it can baptise, confess, absolve and bury its own, and no outside cleric need ever enter it.

It granted the order all spoils taken from the enemies of the Church, and forbade that they be compelled to share them. The bull's own words on the point are direct: what they receive from the spoils they may confidently put to their own use, and none may coerce them into giving a portion of it to anyone.

It confirmed the Rule and forbade any professed brother to return to secular life. The immediate purpose is discipline. The effect is that membership is irreversible.

And it made the order answerable to the pope alone.

Two further bulls completed the structure — Celestine II's *Milites Templi* in 1144 and Eugene III's *Militia Dei* in 1145 — but the shape was set in 1139.

Now stand back and describe what had been created, in terms nobody in 1139 possessed.

It is a **transnational corporation**: a single legal person operating simultaneously in a dozen sovereignties, whose members and property move across borders without licence, and whose internal command runs from Jerusalem to Portugal without passing through any king's chancery.

It is **tax-exempt**, in a world where every other institution pays.

It is **immune from local jurisdiction**, secular and ecclesiastical alike, and therefore effectively immune from ordinary process: a Templar accused of a crime is a matter for the order, and beyond it for Rome.

It has **perpetual succession** and irreversible membership, so that its property never disperses through inheritance and its personnel never leak away.

And it is **accountable to exactly one person**, who lives fifteen hundred miles from most of its assets and possesses no means of auditing any of them.

Nobody designed that. Innocent II was settling a jurisdictional nuisance for a client of his most important ally, and acquiring a loyal armed body of his own in the bargain — which, for a pope who had just fought a decade-long schism for control of his own church, was worth having. Robert de Craon was trying to stop bishops taxing his farms. Both men were reading a real ledger and neither was wrong about it.

The architect's hour is complete in a single document, and the skew is entirely visible. The settlement served the position of the men who made it: the pope acquired an instrument answerable to him alone; the order acquired the most complete exemption in Christendom.

And the exemption is the whole story, because an exemption has two faces and only one of them is visible from inside. It removes everyone who can interfere with you. It also removes everyone who has standing to protect you. Every bishop, every count, every king who was told in 1139 that this order was none of his business would, in 1307, have no business with it.

Which was fine, for a hundred and sixty-eight years, because the one man to whom they answered was in Rome and beyond any king's reach.

PART VI

The Bank Nobody Founded

The Templars are routinely described as the inventors of international banking. The description is roughly true and entirely misleading about how it happened, and the mechanism is one of the cleanest by-products in this collection.

Start with the logistical problem, which is boring and which nobody has ever made a film about.

The order's fighting strength was in the Levant. Its income was in Europe. Donations came in as land — a manor in Yorkshire, a vineyard in Aquitaine, a mill in Aragon — and land produces rents in local coin. To convert a Lincolnshire manor into a horse in Palestine required moving value across two thousand miles of country in which the coinage changed every few days' ride, weights and purities varied, rulers periodically recalled and re-struck their money, and the roads were unsafe.

Every institution with property in more than one country faced a version of this. What made the Templar version tractable was three properties the order had acquired for entirely unrelated reasons.

It had houses everywhere. The donations had produced a network of preceptories running from Ireland to Cyprus — not designed as a network, simply the residue of where people happened to give land.

It had internal trust. The men in the London house and the men in the Jerusalem house were under the same vows, the same discipline, the same Rule, and the same command. A brother's word and a brother's seal were good at the other end of the chain in a way that no merchant's were.

And it had the exemption. *Omne datum optimum* let the order's people and goods cross borders without local interference. That is precisely the licence a clearing network requires and precisely what nobody else could get.

Give those three properties to men with a treasury problem and the solution is not hard to find. A knight departing for the East deposits his coin at the Paris Temple and receives a document; he presents the document in Jerusalem and draws the equivalent, less a charge. The metal never travels. Only the promise travels. From about the middle of the twelfth century the order was doing this routinely, and the instrument — a receipt, often a chirograph, a document cut in two so that the halves must match — is the ancestor of the letter of credit and, at some remove, of every wire transfer since.

Now watch it grow, because it grows the way institutions actually grow: by other people finding uses for it.

Pilgrims used it, which was the origin. Then crusading nobles. Then kings. In 1172 Henry II of England entrusted the Templars with the money he had pledged in penance for the killing of Thomas Becket — a sum, on the contemporary reckoning, sufficient to maintain two hundred knights in the Holy Land for a year. King John deposited the English crown jewels at the New Temple in London. Henry III kept the royal treasury at the Temple, resided there for part of his reign, had a Templar brother manage his personal expenditure, and used the network as one would use a bank — settling a debt to the count of Flanders in instalments drawn on the order's Flemish house, and making a payment to the emperor in Constantinople through the Templar house there. When Henry bought the island of Oléron he did it through the Temple, paying £200 a year for five years into the London house against delivery.

And in France it went further than anywhere else. **For roughly a century the Temple in Paris was the treasury of the kingdom.** The royal revenues were received there; the royal treasurers were senior officers of the order; the crown's accounts were kept and audited on the premises. The specialised clerks who came to sit at the Temple to examine the accounts of royal officers in the field are the institutional ancestors of the French audit court. Louis VII borrowed heavily from the order on the Second Crusade. A century later,

after the disaster at Damietta, the Templars advanced Louis IX so much of the money for his ransom and his subsequent expenses in the Holy Land that it strained the order badly.

Not one person in this story set out to found a bank. There was no decision, no founding moment, no architect's hour for the financial arm at all — which is itself worth noting, because it demonstrates that not every important structure has one. What there was, was a shipping problem, a network that existed for other reasons, a legal exemption obtained to settle a quarrel with bishops, and a hundred and fifty years of people finding that the arrangement solved their problem too.

This is the mechanism the collection's theoretical paper identifies: the builder optimises the parts and the power lives in the fit between them, which is visible from no position that looks at parts. The men who accepted a manor in Lincolnshire in 1160 were acquiring rents. What they were also doing, collectively and invisibly, was extending a clearing network by one node.

Three consequences followed, none of them chosen.

The order became indispensable to the crowns it served, which is a good position until the moment your client decides that indispensability is a form of leverage against him rather than for him.

It became a repository of financial intelligence. The Paris Temple knew the state of the French crown's accounts, because it kept them. There are few pieces of knowledge more dangerous to hold about a man who is running out of money.

And it became, in the popular understanding of the fourteenth century and every century since, rich. The perception is the important thing, and it was substantially wrong in a way that will matter enormously in Part XI: the order's wealth was overwhelmingly *land*, immobilised, encumbered, and yielding a modest return. It was not a vault of coin. But nobody outside the order could see the difference, and the man who most needed it to be a vault of coin was the king of France.

PART VII

The Order Among Its Neighbours

The Templars existed to fight, and this part exists to record that they did it, because a study concentrating on charters and finance can leave the impression that the military function was decorative. It was not.

For a hundred and seventy years the order provided the Latin East with something it otherwise entirely lacked: a permanent professional force, in country, not dispersing at the end of a campaigning season, holding castles that a feudal levy could not garrison. The Templars and the Hospitallers between them held a substantial proportion of the fortified places of the crusader states — a pilgrim writing in 1172 observed that the two orders had taken possession of almost all the cities and villages of the region, had built castles everywhere and filled them with garrisons, and possessed besides countless estates in other lands. The military orders were the standing army the kingdom of Jerusalem could not otherwise afford, and they were, by the general testimony of their contemporaries including their enemies, formidable.

They were also, by the same testimony, disastrous when badly led. At the Springs of Cresson in May 1187 the Grand Master Gerard de Ridefort led a small force into a hopeless engagement and lost most of it. Two months later, on 4 July 1187, the field army of the kingdom was destroyed at Hattin, and Saladin executed the captured Templars and Hospitallers rather than ransoming them — a compliment of a kind, and an accurate assessment of which prisoners would come back.

But the aspect of the order's external conduct that this study needs is not the battles. It is the economics of the Levant, because they connect this volume directly to the preceding one.

The Templars levied tribute on the Assassins.

The Syrian Nizari Ismailis — the subject of the companion study, whose castles in the Jabal Bahra lay adjacent to Templar territory — paid the order an annual sum, generally given in the tradition as two thousand gold pieces. The Templars were locally the stronger party and had made the Nizaris tributary, at a date the sources do not fix.

In 1172 or 1173, Rashid al-Din Sinan — the man the Crusaders called the Old Man of the Mountain — attempted to end the payments. He sent an envoy to King Amalric of Jerusalem with a remarkable proposal: that he and his people would accept Christianity and baptism, provided the king would make the Templars renounce the tribute and live thereafter as good neighbours. Amalric was enthusiastic and guaranteed the envoy safe conduct.

On the road home, the envoy was ambushed and killed by a party of Templars under a one-eyed knight named Walter du Mesnil.

The king was incandescent, and the reason is obvious: a conversion of the Nizaris would have been the diplomatic coup of the reign, and it had been destroyed by his own side to protect an income stream. Amalric demanded the knight's surrender. The Grand Master, Odo de Saint-Amand, refused — on the ground that a Templar was answerable to the pope and to no one else, and that he would send the man to Rome for judgment. Amalric arrested him anyway, and died before the matter went further. The negotiations lapsed and were not resumed.

Three things in that episode deserve to be marked.

The first is that the exemption was not a formality. In 1173 a Grand Master invoked *Omne datum optimum* against the king of Jerusalem, in a murder case, on the king's own territory, and had a colourable argument. That is what a hundred and thirty-four years of accumulated privilege looked like in operation, and it explains why by 1300 there was no ruler in Europe who did not resent the order.

The second is that the murder was almost certainly not the act of a rogue. Most analysts have thought Walter du Mesnil was acting on instruction, because the beneficiary of the killing was the order's balance sheet and nobody else.

And the third is the shape of the whole Levantine economy this reveals. The picture of crusade as a straightforward confrontation of faiths does not survive contact with the accounts. What is actually there is a protection market: the Templars taxing the Nizaris; the Nizaris taxing Christian and Muslim princes alike; Saladin buying a truce from Sinan after two attempts on his life; everyone paying somebody, and periodically killing over the terms. Both orders in this pair of studies financed themselves substantially by selling other people's safety back to them. Neither designed that. It is what a landscape of fortified minorities with no central authority produces, every time, wherever it occurs.

PART VIII

The Loss of the Object

On 18 May 1291 the Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf Khalil took Acre, the last significant Latin holding on the Syrian coast. The Templar Grand Master, Guillaume de Beaujeu, was killed in the fighting. The order's Levantine houses evacuated to Cyprus. Within a few weeks the remaining coastal towns were abandoned.

The kingdom of Jerusalem had ceased to exist, and with it the reason for the Knights Templar.

This is the moment at which the framework says an institution is in mortal danger, and the danger is of a kind that no amount of wealth or privilege addresses, because it is not a danger of force. **An institution whose function has expired continues to exist, continues to hold its property, continues to recruit and pray and administer — and has lost the argument for itself, usually without noticing.**

Observe what the order looked like from outside in the 1290s. It held, across Europe, some nine thousand estates and manors. It paid no tithes. It answered to no bishop and no king. It employed thousands of men who were exempt from local justice. It kept the treasury of France. It was, in the popular mind, immensely rich. And the thing it had been given all of that to do could no longer be done, because the place where it was done was gone.

An institution in that condition has, in principle, three options.

Find a new frontier. The Iberian orders had one, and the Teutonic Knights found another in the Baltic and built a state on it that lasted two centuries. The Templars had substantial Iberian holdings and fought there, but their identity and their headquarters were eastern.

Merge. From the Second Council of Lyon in 1274 onward there was persistent pressure — from popes, from theorists of crusade, and eventually from Philip IV of France — to combine the Templars and the Hospitallers into a single order. The logic was obvious: two military orders with the same purpose, one of which had lost its base, competing for the same donations. The Hospitallers had a second function, the care of the sick, which gave them an argument for existing that survived the loss of the Holy Land. The Templars did not.

Or refuse, and wait for a new crusade.

Jacques de Molay, Grand Master from 1292, refused. He argued against the merger in writing when Clement V asked for his views, and he came to France in 1306 or early 1307 to discuss the recovery of the Holy Land — a project he took seriously and in which the order still saw its future.

Read the position rather than the man and the refusal is not stupidity. From inside the order, a merger meant the extinction of an institution with a hundred and seventy years of history, a Rule, a discipline, and its own dead — subsumed into a rival that had spent much of that period competing with it. No Grand Master would have agreed to that lightly, and Molay's reasons, as he set them out, are administrative and serious.

But it is a decision taken inside a field of the visible that no longer corresponds to the world. Molay could see the order, its estates, its personnel, its history, and a crusade that had not yet been called. He could not see what the order looked like from the outside: an armed, exempt, wealthy, secretive, transnational body with no current function, sitting in the middle of a kingdom whose king was insolvent.

The Hospitallers, meanwhile, did the other thing. In 1310 they took Rhodes and made themselves a maritime state with a purpose, and they are still in existence today.

PART IX

The King's Ledger

Philip IV of France, called the Fair, has appeared in this collection before. He is the king who in September 1303 sent his keeper of the seals, Guillaume de Nogaret, with the Colonna faction to seize Pope Boniface VIII at Anagni, three weeks after Boniface had issued the most absolute claim to universal authority in the history of the papal office. Boniface died within the month. Philip then secured the election, in 1305, of a French pope, Clement V, who never went to Rome and whose successors sat at Avignon for sixty-eight years.

This study now requires the other half of that king's ledger, and the entry that runs through everything he did is a single word: **money.**

Philip inherited and vastly expanded a French state — a permanent administration, a professional legal service, a standing apparatus of officials — and he fought expensive wars, principally with England over Gascony and with Flanders. Medieval kingship had no adequate revenue system for that, and the record of his reign is a sequence of increasingly desperate expedients.

He debased the coinage, repeatedly. He is called in the sources the false-coiner king. The consequences were what such consequences always are: prices in real terms rose, rents fixed in nominal coin collapsed, and in 1306 Paris rioted.

During that riot the king took refuge in the Paris Temple.

He seized the Lombards. The Italian banking houses that had financed him were arrested and their assets taken in 1291, and pressed again subsequently.

He expelled the Jews. In 1306 the Jews of France were arrested, expelled and their property confiscated, and their debtors were required to pay the crown instead.

He taxed the clergy, which is what produced the collision with Boniface VIII in the first place, and which he won.

Set out in sequence, the pattern is unmistakable and it does not require any theory of the king's character. **Philip's fiscal method was to identify a wealthy corporate body within his reach that lacked political protection, accuse it, seize it, and keep the proceeds.** He had done it three times. Each operation had worked. Each had been justified by a legal process his own lawyers constructed. And by 1307 he had run out of targets — except one.

Now assemble the Templars' position as it appeared from the royal chancery in the summer of 1307.

They were **rich**, or believed to be. They were **his creditors**, and he owed them. They kept **his treasury**, and therefore knew exactly how bad his position was. They were **militarily useless to him**, since the frontier they existed for had been gone for sixteen years. They were **exempt** from his jurisdiction and from every other, which made them an anomaly in a kingdom he was busy centralising. They had **refused the merger** that would have dissolved the anomaly quietly. They were **secretive**, in the ordinary way of religious orders — their chapters were held behind closed doors, and disaffected former members were available to say what they liked about them. And, decisively, the one authority that could protect them was a Frenchman whom Philip had installed, who was sitting at Poitiers rather than Rome, and who had already seen what happened at Anagni to a pope who resisted this king.

Every element of that had been produced by somebody solving a reasonable problem. The exemption came from a jurisdictional quarrel with bishops in 1139. The wealth came from a century of pious donations. The treasury role came from a logistics network. The secrecy came from a monastic rule. The uselessness came from a defeat at Acre. Not one of them was designed to produce the aggregate.

The aggregate was a body with everything a desperate king needed and nobody to speak for it.

PART X

Friday, 13 October 1307

On 14 September 1307 sealed orders went out from the royal chancery to every bailiff and seneschal in the kingdom of France, not to be opened before the appointed day. They instructed the recipients to prepare for the simultaneous arrest and imprisonment of every member of the Order of the Temple within their jurisdiction.

At dawn on Friday 13 October 1307 the orders were executed. Templars across France were taken in a single coordinated morning — the Grand Master Jacques de Molay among them, in Paris, the day after he had walked as a pallbearer at the funeral of the king's sister-in-law.

Three features of that operation deserve to be recorded precisely.

It was a conspiracy in the full sense. Advance planning, sealed instructions, simultaneity, secrecy, a pre-drafted list of charges, and a deliberate pre-emption of the one authority with jurisdiction. Clement V had written to Philip earlier that year saying that he intended a full investigation of the order in mid-October. Philip arrested them a week before the pope's own inquiry was to begin, using an inquisition the pope had not convened, against a body over which the pope held sole jurisdiction. The framework does not flinch at this. **The architect's hour is intentional, and here it is documented to the day.**

The charges were a template. The Templars were accused of requiring new members to deny Christ and spit on the crucifix; of obscene kisses at reception; of sodomy; of worshipping an idol, sometimes called Baphomet; and of omitting the words of consecration at Mass. This is very nearly the standard heresy indictment of the period, and Philip's own lawyers had rehearsed most of it four years earlier against Boniface VIII. The same office, largely the same personnel, and much the same accusations, deployed a second time against a second target.

And the confessions came under torture. They came in volume — Molay himself confessed, as did a great majority of those examined in France — and they came in the characteristic form: agreeing to the interrogator's proposition, contradicting each other in every detail, and describing the alleged idol as a bearded head, a cat, a skull, a three-faced figure, or nothing at all. Outside France, where the crown's pressure was weaker and torture initially not applied, confessions were rare to nonexistent.

Now the thing that has never been adequately explained by any conspiratorial account of this order, and which the position reading explains without difficulty.

They did not resist.

There were, in France in October 1307, on the order of two thousand Templars, a substantial number of them trained fighting men, distributed among fortified houses with walls, weapons and provisions, belonging to an order whose entire purpose was armed force and which had spent a century and a half being extremely good at it. There is no record of a fight anywhere. The gates were opened and the men were taken.

Why?

Because they were a religious order under vows of obedience, in a Christian kingdom, in a legal universe in which the king had no authority over them and the pope did. From inside, on 13 October, this was an outrage that would obviously be corrected: the pope would intervene, the arrests would be found unlawful, the brothers would be released. To resist a king's officers by force would be to become exactly what they were accused of being. Their entire training in the meaning of their own privileges told them that they were safe, because for a hundred and sixty-eight years the privileges had made them safe.

They were defended by a document, and the document required somebody to enforce it.

Clement V was, initially, furious — not on the Templars' behalf particularly, but because his jurisdiction had been usurped. He asserted himself as best he could. On 22 November 1307 he issued *Pastoralis praeem-*

inentiae, ordering all Christian monarchs to arrest the Templars in their territories and hold their property in the Church's name — an instruction that reads as an attempt to seize control of a process already running, and had the effect of extending the arrests across Europe.

In July 1308 at Poitiers he heard the confessions of seventy-two Templars brought to him and absolved them. And in August 1308 he obtained access, at last, to the leadership.

PART XI

The Absolution and the Suppression

Between 17 and 20 August 1308, at the castle of Chinon in Touraine, three cardinals sent by Clement V examined Jacques de Molay and the other senior officers of the order. The prisoners confessed to certain irregularities, asked absolution, and received it: they were reconciled to the Church and readmitted to the sacraments.

The record of that hearing was drawn up as a parchment, sealed by the three cardinals, and filed in the papal archive, where it was misplaced — damaged and shelved among unrelated material — and remained unread for nearly seven centuries. It was rediscovered in the Vatican archive in September 2001 by the historian Barbara Frale and published in 2007.

The Chinon parchment shows that the only authority competent to judge the Templars absolved their leadership of heresy in August 1308, and then suppressed the order anyway in March 1312.

That the pope's private view differed from his public act had been argued from indirect evidence long before 2001; what the parchment supplies is the document. And it makes the character of the whole proceeding legible in a way the trial records never did.

What followed took four years and is best read as a man being ground down.

Clement attempted to hold a proper process. Papal commissions were established in 1309 and 1310 to hear the order's defence, and when the brothers were permitted to speak collectively rather than individually, they began to retract. Hundreds withdrew their confessions and offered to defend the order.

The crown's answer was procedural and lethal. A man who confesses to heresy and then retracts is, in canon law, a relapsed heretic, and a relapsed heretic is handed to the secular arm and burned. On 12 May 1310, fifty-four Templars were burned outside Paris for having retracted. The defence collapsed immediately, and did not reassemble.

The Council of Vienne opened in October 1311. The assembled fathers were, by most accounts, unwilling to condemn the order without allowing it to be heard, and it had not been heard. Philip arrived in the vicinity with an army.

On 22 March 1312 Clement V issued *Vox in excelso*.

Its mechanism is the most revealing thing in the entire case. **The bull does not condemn the Templars.** It states that the process had not established the charges by definitive sentence, and then abolishes the order anyway — not by judicial condemnation but by way of provision, an administrative act of the apostolic see, on the ground that the order's reputation had been so damaged that it could no longer usefully serve the Holy Land. On 2 May 1312 the bull *Ad providam* transferred the order's property to the Hospitallers, excepting the Iberian kingdoms, with some reserved to pension surviving brothers.

Three findings follow, and they are the framework's signature.

The suppression was not a verdict. The order was abolished by an administrative decision of the one man who had privately absolved it, taken under duress, on the explicit ground that its reputation was ruined — a reputation ruined by an accusation that same man had declined to uphold. It is one of the purest instances in the record of a legal form being used to produce an outcome the law could not reach.

Philip did not get what he wanted. The property went to the Hospitallers by papal decree, not to the crown. In France he retained control of a great deal in practice, and the Hospitallers had to pay heavily to obtain what they did — but the vault of coin was never there. The order's wealth was land: mortgaged, encumbered, slow, and administratively expensive. The transfer of the estates in England alone took decades. The treasure that has occupied the imagination of Europe for seven hundred years did not exist in the form the imagination requires.

And the order was not destroyed everywhere. In Portugal, King Denis declined to persecute the brothers and instead reconstituted them as the Order of Christ, which received the Templar property and continued — and which, a century later, financed the Portuguese voyages down the African coast under Prince Henry. In Aragon the process was similarly resisted and the property went to a new order. The Templars ended as an order of Latin Christendom; in two kingdoms they simply changed their name.

On 18 March 1314 Jacques de Molay and Geoffroi de Charney, preceptor of Normandy, were brought out to hear their sentences of perpetual imprisonment and instead publicly declared that their confessions had been false and the order innocent. They were burned that evening on a small island in the Seine.

Molay had been Grand Master for twenty-two years. His last recorded act was to withdraw a confession he knew would kill him for withdrawing it, which is not the conduct of a man protecting a secret.

PART XII

The Legend and Its Makers

The order ended in 1312. The legend began, on any reasonable dating, four hundred and twenty-five years later, and its makers were not the prosecutors.

Take the components in order.

Baphomet. The word occurs in the trial confessions as the name of an idol the Templars were said to worship. Modern philology, and the Oxford English Dictionary, identify it as an Old French corruption of *Mahomet* — the medieval European rendering of Muhammad — and the word is attested in that sense long before the trial, in a crusader's letter of 1098 and in Occitan verse. Medieval Christians wrongly believed Islam to be idolatrous; the accusation, in its original context, was that the Templars had been corrupted by long contact with the Saracens into worshipping their god. The descriptions given under torture contradict one another completely — a bearded head, a cat, a skull, a three-faced figure — and the order did in fact possess several silver-gilt reliquary heads of the ordinary kind, which is very likely what some of the prisoners were being pressed to describe. **The claim of an idol named Baphomet appears nowhere in the historical record except in the interrogation of the Templars.**

The Gnostic reading. In 1782 the Berlin bookseller, Freemason and Enlightenment figure Christoph Friedrich Nicolai published an essay proposing that the Templars had been Gnostics and that *Baphomet* derived from Greek words meaning the baptism of wisdom. There is no basis for this. It is the first attempt to convert the prosecution's slur into a secret doctrine, and it is the hinge of everything that follows, because it establishes the move: take the charge, deny that it was blasphemy, and reinterpret it as esoteric truth.

The goat. The image everyone now has of Baphomet — the horned, winged, androgynous figure with the torch between its horns — was drawn by the French occultist Éliphas Lévi in 1856, seven hundred years after the order was founded and five hundred and forty-four after it was abolished. It is a nineteenth-century composition and has no medieval antecedent whatever.

The Masonic descent. In 1737 Andrew Michael Ramsay — a Scot, a Jacobite exile in Paris, a convert to Catholicism, and Grand Orator of a Masonic body there — delivered an oration in which he traced Freemasonry to the crusaders, describing them as ancestors who had gathered from all parts of Christendom in the Holy Land and resolved to unite the individuals of all nations into a single fraternity. Ramsay was not primarily talking about the Templars; he invoked the crusading orders generally. But the idea landed, particularly in Germany, and within twenty years Templar degrees had been constructed on it. From the 1750s Baron Karl Gotthelf von Hund's Rite of Strict Observance claimed direct descent from the order through fugitive knights and a chain of Unknown Superiors whom von Hund was never able to produce. There is no evidence for any of it, and historians have found none in three centuries of looking.

The Grail. Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival*, written around 1210–1220, gives the Grail a guard of knights he calls *templeise*, and that is the seed. The modern construct — the Templars as custodians of a bloodline, a document, or a secret capable of overturning Christianity — dates to *The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail* in 1982 and reached its widest audience in a novel of 2003 that sold in the tens of millions.

And the date. The association of Friday the thirteenth with misfortune, and with the arrests of 1307, is modern. No medieval source connects them; the superstitions about Fridays and about the number thirteen have separate and older histories; the link to the Templars appears in the twentieth century and became general only after the novel.

Now set this beside the preceding study, because the pair produces a finding neither yields alone.

The Nizari Ismailis acquired a legend written by their **enemies**. It was a slur — drugged fanatics manipulated by an old man in a garden — designed to explain away their discipline by making it chemical, and to

render them contemptible. It replaced them so completely that the word for their name is now a common noun for murderer in a dozen languages.

The Templars acquired a legend written substantially by their **admirers**. It is a flattery — guardians of hidden wisdom, survivors of a suppression, holders of a secret worth killing for — designed to borrow their prestige for eighteenth-century Masonic degrees and, later, to sell books.

And the two legends do the same thing, by the same mechanism, with the same result.

Both were composed by people who had never met the institution and had no access to its records. Both grew fastest when the institution was safely extinct and could not object. Both proved far more durable than anything the institutions actually built — the fortresses are rubble and the preceptories are farms, and the legends are worth money this year. And both work by supplying a *mechanism* for something that seemed inexplicable: the Nizari legend explains why a man would die on command by making him drugged; the Templar legend explains why a king would destroy a monastic order by making it guilty of something enormous. In each case the true explanation was a position — a hunted minority with no army; a king who had run out of people to rob — and in each case the true explanation was rejected as insufficient, because a large effect is felt to require a large cause.

That reflex is the one this collection's method exists to correct, and here are two specimens of it seven hundred years apart, running in opposite emotional directions, and identical in structure.

PART XIII

The Ledger

Both columns, in ink.

In the column of the achievements, which are real: for nearly two centuries the Templars supplied the Latin East with the only permanent professional garrison it had, held castles that would otherwise have been held by nobody, and provided the standing military capacity a kingdom of a few hundred knights could not otherwise raise. They protected the pilgrim roads, which is what they were founded to do and which they did. They built, as a by-product of a logistics problem, the first international deposit-and-transfer network in Europe — an instrument that reduced the cost and danger of moving value across borders and whose descendants everyone now uses daily. They gave the French crown a functioning treasury and an audit apparatus. And they took the greater part of the casualties of two centuries of fighting on a frontier their contemporaries thought worth holding.

In the column of the costs, held at equal strength: the order was an instrument of a movement that killed a very great many people, and it took its share in that. It was arrogant, and its arrogance was structural: an exemption from all jurisdiction produces men who behave as though they are exempt from all jurisdiction, and the murder of an ambassador on a king's safe-conduct in 1173 to protect an annual tribute is a fair specimen of what that looks like in operation. It taxed the safety of its neighbours and killed to keep the revenue. And its enormous accumulated privilege was purchased, ultimately, from a papacy that granted it for its own reasons, at the expense of every bishop, parish and lord whose ordinary rights were overridden — a resentment that accumulated for a hundred and sixty-eight years and was available to be spent by anyone who wanted it.

Against both columns stands the fact that the men burned in 1310 and 1314 were killed for crimes that the one authority competent to judge them had, in a sealed parchment, privately decided they had not committed.

The case resolves, as this project's cases tend to, against both easy pictures and into the harder one between them.

It was a conspiracy — the destruction was — and the conspiracy theory is still wrong. The arrests of 13 October 1307 are as documented an act of coordinated state deception as the medieval record contains: sealed orders, a fixed day, a prepared indictment, a deliberate pre-emption of the competent jurisdiction. The framework does not dispute it; the framework predicts that such hours occur and that they are skewed, in the open, toward the position of whoever is designing them. What the framework denies is that Philip controlled the sequel, and he did not. He did not get the treasure, because there was no treasure of the kind he needed. The property went to his rivals by papal decree. In Portugal and Aragon the order continued under other names, and the Portuguese branch outlived him by centuries and helped finance the discovery of a sea route to India. And the reputation he manufactured to justify the seizure escaped entirely, was reinterpreted by admirers into its opposite, and has spent seven hundred years making the Templars more famous than any king of France.

And it was not an accident. Every step was taken by an identifiable person solving a problem he could see. Hugues de Payens proposed to police a road. Bernard of Clairvaux resolved a contradiction between vows and violence for a body of men who needed it resolved. Robert de Craon wanted bishops to stop taxing his farms. Innocent II, freshly out of a schism, wanted an armed body loyal to himself and owed Bernard a favour. A treasurer in Paris wanted to move a manor's rents to Palestine without carrying the coin. Jacques de Molay wanted to preserve an order with a hundred and seventy years of history. Philip IV wanted money.

It was an architect's hour, and then another — 1120, 1129, 1139, 1144, 1145, 1291, 1307, 1308, 1312, 1737 — each a bounded episode in which real people solved a pressing problem with the materials at hand, and then died and handed the result to a structure that carried it forward on a logic none of them chose.

And the reversal at the centre of this case is the exemption, which is why it gives the volume its title.

Omne datum optimum was obtained to stop bishops interfering with a few farms. It made the order answerable to one man. For a hundred and sixty-eight years that was the best position in Christendom: no bishop could touch them, no king could try them, no local court could reach them, and the single authority above them was a thousand miles away and had every reason to protect his own instrument.

Then a French king captured the papacy — and the order discovered that it had spent a century and three-quarters ensuring that nobody else on earth had standing to speak for it. There was no bishop with jurisdiction, no lord with obligation, no king with a claim, no court with a remedy. Every door had been closed by the order's own charter, at the order's own request. When the one remaining door was held shut from the outside, two thousand trained soldiers in fortified houses across France opened their gates without a fight, because the document said they were safe, and the document was all they had.

A privilege that removes everyone who can constrain you removes everyone who can defend you, and the two are the same people. That is not a paradox. It is the same sentence read from the other end, and it is invisible from the position of the men signing the charter, because on the day it is signed the constraint is the problem and the protection is not yet needed.

The most durable thing in this story is not a man, not a fortress, not a treasure, and not the plot, which was real and is dated to the day. It is a name — attached to nine knights by the accident of where a king of Jerusalem had a spare stable — running still, in a legend written by strangers who admired what they had invented, about an order whose actual secret was that there wasn't one.

Held, like everything in this project, as tested, not revealed.

A Note on Sources

This is a work of synthesis, and every quotation and figure has been verified to a published source; none is invented.

On the evidentiary problem. The bulk of the sensational material concerning the Templars derives from the trial depositions of 1307–1311, taken under or in the shadow of torture, and is treated in this study as evidence of the prosecution's intentions rather than of the order's practices. The standard modern treatment is Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978; 2nd ed. 2006), and Barber's *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, 1994) is the standard institutional history. Peter Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth* (1987), and Barbara Frale, *The Templars: The Secret History Revealed* (2004), are used as indicated. Alain Demurger's work on Molay is cited in the same literature.

On the landscape and the founding. The condition of the kingdom of Jerusalem after 1099, the departure of the crusading host, the shortage of manpower and the dangers to pilgrims on the Jaffa and Jordan roads follow the standard histories of the Latin East. The reported attack of Easter 1119 with some three hundred pilgrims killed and sixty enslaved comes through the chronicle tradition and is flagged in the text as indicative rather than audited. The founding of the order by Hugues de Payens and Godfrey de Saint-Omer around 1119 — with the date variously given between 1118 and 1120 and the number of founders given traditionally as nine — the approach to King Baldwin II and the patriarch Warmund, the grant of permission probably at the Council of Nablus on 16 January 1120, and the grant of quarters in the al-Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount, believed to stand on the site of the Temple of Solomon and giving the order its name, follow the standard accounts, including Barber and the Riley-Smith literature; William of Tyre, writing around 1185, is the principal narrative source and calls the founder Hugo de Paganis.

On Troyes and Bernard. The Council of Troyes opened on 13 January 1129 under the papal legate Matthew, cardinal-bishop of Albano, Honorius II being absent; it approved the Latin Rule. Baldwin II's commissioning of clerics in 1126 to approach Bernard of Clairvaux, and Bernard's kinship with the founding knight André de Montbard, follow the same literature. Bernard's *De laude novae militiae* (In Praise of the New Knighthood) supplies the argument summarised here, including the distinction between the knight of the world and the knight of Christ and the formulation that the latter is not a homicide but, so to speak, a *malicide*; the treatise is conventionally dated between about 1128 and 1136 and the dating is not settled.

On *Omne datum optimum*. Issued by Innocent II at the Lateran on 29 March 1139 and addressed to Grand Master Robert de Craon. Its provisions — direct protection of the Apostolic See; exemption from tithes; retention of all spoils, with the express prohibition on any compelled sharing; permission to build churches, cemeteries and houses and to maintain chaplains; confirmation of the Rule; the bar on professed brothers returning to secular life; and the establishment of the order as answerable to the pope alone, free of local episcopal and secular obedience — follow the standard editions and Barber. Robert de Craon's motive in seeking papal protection against ecclesiastical criticism over tithes and alms follows Upton-Ward and

Barber. Innocent II's own position — his emergence from the schism with the antipope Anacletus II, who died in January 1138, and his debt to Bernard of Clairvaux — follows the standard papal histories, and the reading of the bull as serving that position is this study's analytical claim. *Milites Templi* (Celestine II, 1144) and *Militia Dei* (Eugene III, 1145) completed the privileges.

On the financial operations. The letter of credit and chirograph mechanism, the preceptory network, and the practice of deposit and transfer from the mid-twelfth century follow the standard treatments of Templar finance. Henry II's Becket penance money entrusted to the order in 1172, sufficient on the contemporary reckoning to maintain two hundred knights in the Holy Land for a year; King John's deposit of the English crown jewels at the New Temple; Henry III's residence at the Temple, his deposit of the royal treasury, his Templar financial manager, his payments to the count of Flanders and to Constantinople through the order's houses, and the brokerage of his purchase of the island of Oléron at £200 a year for five years; the Paris Temple as the treasury of the kingdom of France with senior Templars serving as royal treasurers; the growth of the royal auditing apparatus around the Temple, ancestral to the Chambre des Comptes; and the loans to Louis VII on the Second Crusade and to Louis IX after Damietta — follow the standard literature, including the Inner Temple's survey of Templar banking and the crusader-states scholarship. The 1172 pilgrim's observation on the extent of Templar and Hospitaller possessions is quoted from the same literature.

On the military record and the Levantine tribute economy. The Springs of Cresson (May 1187) under Gerard de Ridefort, the destruction of the field army at Hattin on 4 July 1187 and Saladin's execution of the captured Templars and Hospitallers, and the fall of Acre on 18 May 1291 with the death of Grand Master Guillaume de Beaujeu, follow the standard crusade histories. The Templar tribute levied on the Syrian Nizaris, generally given as two thousand gold pieces annually; Sinan's embassy to King Amalric in 1172 or 1173 offering conversion in return for remission of the tribute; the killing of the envoy on his return by a Templar party under Walter du Mesnil; Grand Master Odo de Saint-Amand's refusal to surrender him on the ground of papal jurisdiction; and Amalric's arrest of him and death before the matter concluded — follow the standard accounts deriving from William of Tyre, and the scholarship on Templar–Nizari relations. This study's companion volume, *The Rock and the Rumour*, treats the other side of that relationship.

On the loss of the object. The evacuation to Cyprus after 1291; the persistent proposals from the Second Council of Lyon (1274) onward to merge the Templars and Hospitallers; Jacques de Molay's written opposition to the merger and his journey to France in 1306–1307 to discuss the recovery of the Holy Land; and the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes in 1310 — follow Barber and the standard literature.

On Philip IV. The seizure of Boniface VIII at Anagni in September 1303 under Guillaume de Nogaret and the subsequent election of Clement V in 1305 are treated at length in this collection's companion study *The Last Roman Office* and follow the sources cited there. The repeated debasements and the resulting Paris riot of 1306, during which the king took refuge in the Paris Temple; the seizure of the Lombard bankers in 1291; and the expulsion of the Jews and confiscation of their property in 1306 with their debts redirected to the crown — follow the standard histories of the reign.

On the arrests and trial. The secret orders to all bailiffs and seneschals of 14 September 1307; the arrests at dawn on Friday 13 October 1307; Clement V's prior letter announcing an investigation *super statu templi* for mid-October; the articles of accusation; the confessions and their retraction; *Pastoralis praeeminentiae* of 22 November 1307 ordering arrests throughout Christendom; the absolution of seventy-two Templars at

Poitiers in July 1308; the papal commissions and the collective defence; and the burning of fifty-four Templars outside Paris on 12 May 1310 as relapsed heretics — follow Barber's *Trial of the Templars* and the standard accounts. Estimates of the number arrested in France vary widely and are contested; the order of two thousand used here follows the more conservative scholarship.

On Chinon, Vienne and the suppression. The examination of the Templar leadership at Chinon between 17 and 20 August 1308 by three cardinals sent by Clement V, their absolution and reconciliation, and the sealed parchment recording it — misfiled in the Vatican archive, rediscovered in September 2001 by Barbara Frale and published in 2007 in *Processus contra Templarios* — follow the Vatican Apostolic Archive material and Frale's publication. The Council of Vienne opening in October 1311; *Vox in excelso* of 22 March 1312 suppressing the order by way of provision rather than by definitive sentence, on the ground of irreparable damage to its reputation rather than proven heresy; *Ad providam* of 2 May 1312 transferring the property to the Hospitallers with the Iberian kingdoms excepted and provision reserved for pensions; the difficulty and duration of the transfer; and the burning of Jacques de Molay and Geoffroi de Charney on 18 March 1314 after their public retraction — follow the same sources and the Cambridge study of the Lincolnshire estates for the mechanics of the property transfer. The continuation of the order in Portugal as the Order of Christ under King Denis, and the parallel Aragonese arrangement, follow the standard literature.

On the legend. The identification of *Baphomet* as an Old French corruption of *Mahomet*, its attestation in that sense in a crusader letter of 1098 and in Occitan verse before the trial, the contradictory descriptions of the alleged idol in the depositions, and the order's possession of silver-gilt reliquary heads, follow Peter Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, the Oxford English Dictionary, and the standard scholarship. Christoph Friedrich Nicolai's 1782 essay proposing a Gnostic derivation, and Éliphas Lévi's 1856 drawing of the horned figure, follow the same literature. Andrew Michael Ramsay's oration of 1737 connecting Freemasonry to the crusading orders, and the subsequent construction of Templar degrees and of Baron Karl Gotthelf von Hund's Rite of Strict Observance from the 1750s with its unproduced Unknown Superiors, follow the Masonic-historical literature, including the Scottish Rite's own account of the oration. Wolfram von Eschenbach's *templeise* guarding the Grail in *Parzival* (c. 1210–1220) is the medieval seed; the modern Templar–Grail–bloodline construct dates to 1982 and its mass diffusion to 2003. The association of Friday the thirteenth with the arrests is modern and is not found in medieval sources.

On the framework. The concepts of *position*, the *field of the visible*, *convergence*, the *architect's hour* and the *institution's logic* belong to the Patterns of Power project of which this paper is part and are developed across its studies, in particular *Position Logic* and *Against the Historian's Reflex*. The reading of a network's value as residing in the fit between its parts rather than in the parts follows this collection's theoretical paper, *The Composable Class*. The comparison of doctrinal architects' hours in Part IV draws on *The Last Roman Office* and *The Rock and the Rumour*, and the paired analysis of legend-formation in Part XII is the reason those two volumes and this one are read together. Where this study's claims err, they should err visibly, in a form the cited scholarship can correct.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, not revealed.